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Introduction 
As argued by Paul Heywood in this volume, the effectiveness of the 
principal-agent model approach to anti-corruption policy-making had been 
questioned in the light of accumulating evidence for the underperformance 
of anti-corruption interventions.1 Recent research has revisited the 
theoretical underpinnings of these interventions to gain new insights, 
arguing for a move away from principal-agent based interventions to ones 
that emphasize collective action, which is more relevant for systemically 
corrupt environments. The collective action perspective is better equipped 
to embrace the fact that while corruption is widely perceived as a social 
bad, it is also widely practised by individuals seeking to find practical 
solutions to real-life problems. In other words, where outsiders characterize 
corruption as a ‘disease’, the causes, conditions and effects of which must 
be diagnosed, monitored and cured,2 insiders tend to perceive it as a ‘cure’ 
Stanislav Shekshnia is Senior Affiliate Professor of Entrepreneurship and Family 
Enterprise at INSEAD, Fontainebleau, Alena Ledeneva is Professor of Politics and Society 
at UCL SSEES and Elena Denisova-Schmidt is Lecturer for Russian Culture and Society at 
the University of St. Gallen.
1  See also A. Mungiu-Pippidi, The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop 
Control of Corruption, Cambridge, 2015; H. Marquette and C. Pfeiffer, Corruption and 
Collective Action, Anti-Corruption Resource Centre Research Paper 32, Bergen, 2015; 
A. Persson, B. Rothstein and J. Teorell, ‘Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail — Systemic 
Corruption as a Collective Action Problem’, Governance, 26, 2013, 3, pp. 449-71. 
2  S. H. Alatas, Corruption: Its Nature, Causes and Function, Aldershot and Brookfield, 
VT, 1990. See also <www.anticorrp.eu> for the findings of the ANTICORRP Media and 
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for situations where no better solutions are available. Such ambivalence 
in perceptions — ‘if I do it — it’s need, if others do it — it’s greed’ — has 
been insufficiently articulated in research.3 Those involved in corrupt 
practices more often than not are conceptually silenced in the analytical 
frameworks employed to study them. Studies of corporate corruption 
are based predominantly on normative assumptions about good and bad 
governance; appropriate organizational behaviour and misbehaviour; 
bad organizations (bad barrels) and bad individuals (bad apples).4 These 
dichotomies, however, limit our understanding of systemically corrupt 
environments, where principals are not principled, good people do bad 
things and property rights are not secure and the public/private distinction 
cannot be made. Anthropologists find that what appear to be instances 
of corruption from the normative perspective might in fact constitute a 
hybrid phenomenon, best understood on its own terms.5 Moreover, even 
where non-compliant practices that conform to neither official nor social 
norms (or to both but in a hybrid way) are acknowledged on their own 
terms, they are ‘chronically underestimated’ and ‘systematic analyses of 
the practical norms governing these non-compliant practices’ are few.6 
Corruption work package.
3  For an exception, see M. Bauhr, ‘Need or Greed Corruption’, in Good Government: 
The Relevance of Political Science, edited by S. Holmberg and B. Rothstein, Cheltenham, 
2014.
4  Some scholars call it ‘deviant behaviour’: R. E. Kidwell, Jr. and C. L. Martin, ‘The 
Prevalence (and Ambiguity) of Deviant Behaviour at Work: An Overview’, in Kidwell 
and Martin (eds), Managing Organizational Deviance, Thousand Oaks, CA, 2005, pp. 
1–21; S. L. Robinson and R. J. Bennett, ‘A Typology of Deviant Workplace Behaviors: A 
Multidimensional Scaling Study’, Academy of Management Journal, 38, 1995, pp. 555–72, 
or ‘organizational misbehavior’: S. Ackroyd and P. Thompson, ‘Why Organizational 
Misbehavior?’, in Ackroyd and Thompson (eds), Organizational Misbehavior, London, 
1999, pp. 8-30; A. Sagie and S. Stashevsky and M. Koslowsky (eds), Misbehavior and 
Dysfunctional Attitudes in Organizations, New York, 2003; Y. Vardi and E. Weitz, 
Misbehavior in Organizations: Theory, Research and Management, Mahwah, NJ, 2003, but 
very often just a ‘criminal act’: Galt de Jong and Hans van Ees, ‘Firms and Corruption’, 
European Management Review, 11, 2014, 3–4, pp. 187–90.
5  M. L. Caldwell, Not By Bread Alone: Social Support in the New Russia, Berkeley, CA, 
2004; A. Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange, 
Cambridge, 1998; A. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: the Informal Practices that 
Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business, Ithaca, NY, 2006; N. Ries, Russian Talk: Culture 
and Conversation during Perestroika, Ithaca, NY, 1997; R. Mandel, and C. Humphrey (eds), 
Markets and Moralities: Ethnographies of Postsocialism, New York and Oxford, 2002; D. 
Torsello and V. Betrand, ‘The Anthropology of Corruption’, Journal of Management 
Inquiry, 25, 2016, 1, pp. 34–54.
6  J. P. O. de Sardan, ‘For an Anthropology of Gaps, Discrepancies and Contradictions’, 
Antropologia, 3, March 2016, 1, pp. 111-31 (pp. 114, 117). On informal norms and the 
interaction with formal systems, see Princeton University Research on innovations for 
successful societies (for example the Colombia Bogota case and the Philippines cases at 
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Analysing firm-level issues (such as retaining best qualified managers 
who are likely to leave the firm if their informal income opportunities 
are streamlined) through normative approaches and prescriptive policies 
on good governance and integrity in such settings is not sufficient. Focus 
on practical norms and non-compliant practices is not the same as the 
revisionist view of corruption that implies functionality of corruption 
in coping with overly rigid political and bureaucratic regimes.7 We find 
that while the official norms prescribe intolerance and the practical 
norms prescribe tolerance towards corruption, business leaders solve their 
problems by ‘managing’ corruption at the firm level and invent strategies 
‘that work’ to resolve the paradox of official and unofficial constraints.
 The problem-solving approach in our study includes assembling bottom-
up accounts of non-compliant practices and sustaining the meanings the 
actors ascribe to their actions in a context-bound way. We use the language 
of participants in our data collection and in the design of monitoring tools 
for non-compliant practices. We investigate tensions that exist between 
the formal compliance with anti-corruption legislation adopted at the 
national level and the firms’ non-compliant practices essential for solving 
firm-level problems in systemically corrupt environments: where the 
‘letter’ of national anti-corruption regulation is complied with, its ‘spirit’ 
is routinely violated to keep businesses competitive — corporate leaders 
cannot be expected to pioneer anti-corruption campaigns at the firm-level. 
And yet, some of them do. Thus, we seek to explain the cases of outliers 
— leaders experimenting with firm-level anti-corruption strategies — and 
consider these cases of ‘individual agency’ in the context of the debates on 
organizational behaviour:
More recent theoretical developments in organizational research have 
argued that the realm in which single individuals can impact organizational 
performance is so limited that there is essentially no reason to worry 
about whether there are any behaviours or attributes that are unique to 
leadership. For example, resource dependence research8 argues that most 
organizational action can be understood not as an exercise of individual 
agency but as an organizational response to the demands of external actors 
upon which organizations depend for resources and support.9 
<http://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/research/publications>).
7  J. Girling, Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy, London, 1997.
8  J. Pfeffer and G. R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource 
Dependence Approach, New York, 1978.
9  N. Nohria and R. Khurana, ‘Advancing Leadership in Theory and Practice’, in 
Handbook of Leadership Theory and Practice, Cambridge, MA, 2013, pp. 3-26 (p. 9).
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In other words, external pressures are so strong that they over-
determine organizational reactions to set up a ‘template of strategies 
[…] that organization mimics because they are perceived as legitimate 
and appropriate’.10 Such templates in Russia are not so different from 
establishing ‘transparency, accountability, disclosure’ elsewhere. Adopting 
such strategies in systemically corrupt environments, however, results in a 
de-facto situation of ‘over-regulation and under-enforcement’ that leaves it 
to corporate leaders to bridge the gap. Corruption remains one of the main 
challenges in doing business in many countries.11 Examining the current 
initiatives undertaken by companies to manage the risk of corruption, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers found that only 22 per cent of firms are confident 
of the effectiveness of the anti-corruption programmes they already have.12 
Fast-developing economies like China, India, Brazil, Indonesia and Russia 
have all been scoring high in the 2011 Bribery index.13 
1. Identifying and monitoring non-compliant practices
Our previous research has identified business practices ubiquitous in Russia 
and introduced specific tools for monitoring non-compliant practices in 
Russian firms.14 
10  Ibid.
11  R. Fisman and J. Svensson, ‘Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful to Growth? 
Firm Level Evidence’, Journal of Development Economics, 83, 2007, 1, pp. 63-75; R. M. N. 
Galang, ‘Victim or Victimizer: Firm Responses to Government Corruption’, Journal of 
Management Studies, 49, 2012, 2, pp. 429-62; S. Knack and P. Keefer, ‘Institutions and 
Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Indicators’, 
Economics and Politics, 7, 1995, 3, pp. 207-28; P. Mauro, ‘Corruption and Growth’, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 1995, 3, pp. 681-712; A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, 
‘Corruption’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 1993, 3, pp. 599-617; S. Globerman 
and D. Shapiro, ‘Governance Infrastructure and US Foreign Direct Investment’, Journal 
of International Business Studies, 34, 2003, 1, pp. 19-39; K. A. Getz and R. J. Volkema, 
‘Culture, Perceived Corruption and Economics: A Model of Predictors and Outcomes’, 
Business Society, 40, 2001, 1, pp. 7-30.
12  The PricewaterhouseCoopers Report, ‘Confronting Corruption: The Business Case 
for an Effective Anti-Corruption Program’ is available online at <http://www.pwc.com/
gx/en/forensic-accounting-dispute-consulting-services/business-case-anti-corruption-
programme.jhtml>. The report is based on a survey of 390 senior executives, supplemented 
with in-depth interviews with 36 senior executives and experts in anti-corruption efforts. 
The geography of the survey covers many several countries around the world including 
Russia: 42% Asia-Pacific, 16% Middle East and Africa, 23% Western Europe, 8% North 
America, 5% Latin America and 5% Central and Eastern Europe. It examines the current 
and possible future actions companies perform to manage the risk of corruption.
13  <http://www.transparency.org/bpi2011>.
14  S. Shekshnia, A. Ledeneva and E. Denisova-Schmidt, Reflective Leadership vs. 
Endemic Corruption in Emerging Markets, INSEAD Working Paper 2013/121/EFE <http://
sites.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=53474>; S. Shekshnia, A. Ledeneva 
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 Russia is an interesting case:15 it is one of the largest emerging 
economies in the world, yet it is also labelled as one of the most corrupt 
countries.16 In 2008–2011, the Russian government undertook significant 
anti-corruption efforts in line with OECD, WTO and World Bank policy 
recommendations, but the results of such efforts at the firm level have 
been far from conclusive. Part of the reason is political. Mungiu-Pippidi 
observes that many former Communist regimes have attempted to make 
the transition from a particularistic system to a universalistic one (i.e. from 
predominantly relations-based to the predominantly rules-based forms of 
governance), but have so far only reached a stage that she calls ‘competitive 
particularism’. She argues that at this point most countries in the region 
are hybrids, combining the elements of the two ‘ideal types’, while the 
distinction between public and private remains blurred.17 Theoretical 
perspectives based on a presumption of the public/private distinction may 
have misled the policies in the region.18 Marquette and Pfeiffer argue that 
anti-corruption initiatives failed not because they are based on inadequate 
theories, such as principal-agent theory and/or collective action theory, 
but rather because they do not consider the third perspective — that 
corruption might be an effective tool that helps people to get things done, 
especially in weak institutional environments.19 Replacing corrupt channels 
by innovative solutions has been an important shift in public policy 
(e-governance) and among non-governmental organizations (Integrity 
Action Fix rate).20 In order to address corruption-related challenges in 
and E. Denisova-Schmidt, How to Mitigate Corruption in Emerging Markets: The Case of 
Russia, Edmond J. Safra Working Papers No. 36, Cambridge, MA, 2014 <http://discovery.
ucl.ac.uk/1451069/1/EDS_SS_AL_SSRN-id2391950.pdf>.
15  In spite of the current political situation, many international companies still 
consider Russia a promising market in the mid- and long-term perspectives. See E. 
Denisova-Schmidt and O. Kryzhko, ‘Managing Informal Business Practices in Russia: The 
Experience of Foreign Companies’, Mir Rossii, 24, 2015, 4, pp. 149-74. 
16  Transparency International measures the perception of corruption in the public 
sector in the aggregate Corruption Perception Index (CPI). In 2015 Russia was placed at 
119 out of 168 countries.
17  See note 1 above.
18  See articles by Heywood and Camargo-Baez/Ledeneva in this volume and Marquette 
and Pfeiffer (note 1).
19  GCB2013 data shows insignificant variation in the use of contacts. In the USA, a 
person might arrange a job interview as a favour, but that person will not necessarily 
be hired. In Russia and the other BRIC countries, on the other hand, being hired would 
be expected. See D. J. McCarthy, S. M. Puffer, D. Dunlap-Hinkler and A. M. Jaeger, ‘A 
Stakeholder Approach to the Ethicality of BRIC-Firm Managers’ Use of Favors’, Journal of 
Business Ethics, 109, 2012, 1, pp. 27-38.
20  See <http://integrityaction.org/training-materials/56>.
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corporate contexts, we developed a practical tool that allows leadership to 
identify specific non-compliant practices on the firm level and to devise 
mitigating strategies.
 At the exploratory stage, we examined the existing typologies of 
corruption in post-Communist societies21 and conducted a content analysis 
of the media in order to identify corrupt practices that correspond to 
these types. In a 2006 World Bank paper, which adopts the Transparency 
International definition of corruption as ‘the misuse of entrusted power 
for private gain’, economist Stephen Knack organizes these variations 
into six dimensions of corruption: by their level of the political system 
(central government, provincial, municipal), roughly corresponding to 
‘petty’ and ‘grand’ corruption; by the purpose of the improper actions: 
to influence the content of laws and rules (‘state capture’) or to influence 
their implementation (‘administrative corruption’); by the actors involved 
in the corrupt transaction: various combinations of firms, households 
and public officials; by the characteristics of a particular set of actors, 
such as the bribes that are required for large versus small firms, or for 
rich versus poor households; by the administrative agency or service: tax 
and customs, business licenses, inspections, utility connections, courts or 
public education and health facilities; and by the incidence or magnitude 
of bribes or by the uncertainty they create for businesses and households.22 
In more than thirty interviews, we asked CEOs and directors of companies 
operating in Russia to comment on the familiarity of each practice, as 
well as on its frequency. In the 2010 pilot survey, conducted face-to-face, 
we reserved a space for respondents to add to our list of practices — yet 
only two practices have been added.23 Among the obvious reasons as 
to why open-choice survey questions remain unanswered, such a low 
number of additions to the list of informal practices could be interpreted 
either as a validation of sufficiency of the existing list or a statement 
21  V. Tanzi, Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures, 
IMF Staff Papers, 45, IMF, Washington, D.C., 1998; R. Karklins, The System Made Me 
Do It: Corruption in Post-Communist Societies, Ithaca, NY, 2005; S. Knack, Measuring 
Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A Critique of Cross-Country Indicators, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3936, Washington, D.C., 2006; A. Ledeneva, 
How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and 
Business, Ithaca, NY, 2006; A. Ledeneva, ‘From Russia with Blat: Can Informal Networks 
Help Modernize Russia?’, Social Research, 76, 2009, 1, pp. 257-88; A. Ledeneva, Can Russia 
Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance, Cambridge, 2013. 
22  Knack, Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
23  A. Ledeneva, and S. Shekshnia, ‘Doing Business in Russia: Informal Practices and 
Anti-Corruption Strategies’, Russie.Nei.Visions, 58, 2011, IFRI, Paris <https://www.ifri.org/
sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifriledenevashekshniafracorruptionmarch2011jn.pdf>.
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of the unarticulated nature of the practices for those who use them 
routinely (apart from intention to conceal that we did envisage but have 
not encountered).24 While interpreting the pilot data, we made a decision 
to allow the list of questions to be long and inclusive, yet also feasible for 
CEOs to handle in 15-20 minutes. The final questionnaire includes twenty-
seven practices and nineteen anti-corruption strategies (Tables 1 and 2). 
 Inspired by Kay’s concept of obliquity, whereby ‘goals are best achieved 
indirectly’, we have replaced the negatively connoted ‘non-compliant 
practices’ by the more neutral ‘informal ways of getting things done’ — 
the practical norms that CEOs and top managers use to achieve results.25 
We ask the respondents to report anonymously the extent to which their 
firm is engaged in each practice, choosing from three possible answers: 
‘systematically’, ‘sometimes’ or ‘never’, and similar assessments are made 
for strategies.26 Anonymity has been emphasized and preserved, even 
where it imposed serious limitations on our analysis. Given the level of 
our respondents and somewhat sensitive nature of our questions, we had 
to make an extra effort to ensure that those completing the survey were 
willing to share their views. Personal assurances were given where possible. 
 It was not our aim to create a representative sample. Originally we 
identified 500 businessmen — clients of a top executive search company 
— and one of the authors approached them directly. At the later stage we 
added some respondents who attended executive development programmes 
and business school alumni forums (volunteering). The survey data gave 
us insights to explore in the in-depth interviews on the role of leadership 
in systemically corrupt environments, as well as opportunities to explore 
the potential of using the ‘language of participants’ recognized by the 
respondents. 
24  R. M. Groves, D. A. Dillman, J. L. Eltinge and R. J. A. Little, Survey Nonresponse, 
Hoboken, NJ, 2001.
25  J. Kay, Obliquity: Why our Goals are Best Achieved Indirectly, London, 2011.
26  This instrument was tested in the Ukrainian business environment. See E. Denisova-
Schmidt and M. Huber, ‘Regional Differences in Perceived Corruption among Ukrainian 
Firms’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 55, 2014, 1, pp. 10-36; E. Denisova-Schmidt, 
and Y. Prytula, ‘Liike-elämän korruptio Ukrainassa’ (Business Corruption in Ukraine), 
Idäntutkimus: The Finnish Review of East European Studies, 1, 2016, pp. 94–95; E. Denisova-
Schmidt and Y. Prytula, ‘The Shadow Economy and Entrepreneurship in Ukraine’, in The 
Entrepreneurship and Shadow Economy, edited by A. Sauka, F. Schneider and C. Williams, 
Cheltenham and Northampton, MA, 2016, pp. 151–68; E. Denisova-Schmidt, M. Huber 
and Y. Prytula, ‘Corruption among Ukrainian Businesses: Do Firm Size, Industry and 
Region Matter?’, in Johannes Leitner and Hannes Meissner, State Capture, Political Risks 
and International Business: Cases from the Black Sea Region, Abingdon and New York, 
forthcoming 2017; E. Denisova-Schmidt and Y. Prytula, ‘Corruption and Trust Among 
Ukrainian Firms’, Eastern European Economics, forthcoming.  
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2. Conceptualizing ‘managing corruption’ in systemically corrupt 
environments 
Our data set was collected between 2010 and 2013. The total sample includes 
110 questionnaires in addition to thirty in-depth interviews. Appendix 
1 provides an overview of the firms’ characteristics. Although the list of 
characteristics looks rather short, it was congruent to our primary goal 
of reaching out to the firms’ leaders and creating a questionnaire that 
could be completed in 15–20 minutes. It is interesting to note that further 
studies based on this methodology conducted in Ukraine showed no 
statistically significant differences in terms of the firms’ industry or size or 
the respondents’ experiences with the firm, gender or educational levels.27 
 During our in-depth interviews, we asked executives to speak about 
their business environment and systemic corruption in Russia. On the basis 
of the management literature analysis on government corruption, Galang 
argues that a firm’s behaviour in a corrupt environment is determined 
by two factors: the firm’s political resources and the dependence of the 
industry in which it operates on government regulations. Factors such 
as a country’s institutional development, and the corporate culture and 
structure of the firm also play a part.28 Galang identifies four distinct 
strategic approaches to government corruption: 
Alter (high regulatory dependence-high level of political resource) 
which leads to engagement with the government, institutional change 
and regulatory capture; this strategy benefits both the firm and the 
economy.
Avoid (low regulatory dependence-high level of political resource) 
which leads to self-restraint, non-investment and formation of business 
groups; this strategy benefits the firm. 
Ally (high regulatory dependence-low level of political resource) which 
leads to networking and forming joint ventures; this strategy benefits 
both the firm and the economy. 
27  Statistically significant differences were found only in terms of the regions (the 
western part of Ukraine is perceived to be less corrupt) and ownership (foreign companies 
are more resistant to corruption). Denisova-Schmidt, Huber and Prytula, ‘Corruption 
among Ukrainian Businesses’. See also, E. Denisova-Schmidt and M. Huber, ‘Regional 
Differences in Perceived Corruption among Ukrainian Firms’, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, 55, 2014, 1, pp. 10–36, and Denisova-Schmidt and Prytula, ‘Corruption and 
Trust among Ukrainian Firms’. 
28  R. M. N. Galang, ‘Victim or Victimizer: Firm Responses to Government Corruption’, 
Journal of Management Studies, 49, 2012, 2, pp. 429–62. 
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Accede (low regulatory dependence-low level of political resource) 
which leads to acceptance of the rules of the game proposed by 
government officials and bribing; this strategy benefits both the firm 
and the economy.  
 Based on our qualitative data, we identified four dispositions that 
executives take up in relation to corruption that are not dissimilar from 
Galang’s findings:
The first — toleration — is the most widespread among interviewees: 
‘Because the whole society is corrupt, and unless systemic changes 
occur, corruption cannot be effectively dealt with and is widely 
accepted. It is not up to us to promote anti-corruption changes; the 
government should take care of it.’ 
The second — exploitation — is expressed openly only by a small 
minority: ‘Since Russian society is deeply corrupt, corruption should 
not only be accepted but also proactively used to advance business 
interests.’ In other words, the endemic nature of corruption makes it a 
legitimate instrument for doing business. 
The third — avoidance — is also articulated by a small minority: ‘Even 
in an endemically corrupt environment, where corruption is generally 
accepted, it is possible to avoid it and to run a business without it 
playing a role. Others may suffer from corruption but we can find a way 
to stay away from it.’ 
The fourth — management of corruption — is shared by a select 
few: ‘Corruption is a problem and we are working on it, even 
where we are unable to change the environment.’ These executives 
recognize corruption as a major risk and develop specific strategies and 
mechanisms to mitigate it. 
 The four positions articulated above can be organized into a matrix 
demonstrating that the majority of executives do not prioritize a full-scale 
fight against corruption (percentage estimated by the interviewers) (Table 
3). A number of psychological and technical factors prevent them from 
taking up the anti-corruption challenge.
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Table 3. Executives’ attitudes to corruption
Attitudes to corruption Passive attitude Active attitude
Acceptance of corruption as a 
significant risk to business
Toleration (60%) Management (15%)
Non-acceptance of corruption as a 
significant risk to business
Avoidance (15%) Exploitation (10%)
 Failure to recognize corruption as a threat to business in systemically 
corrupt environments (often at a subconscious level) or rationalization of 
personal inability to tackle it prevents executives from managing corruption 
effectively.29 Limited applicability of top-down ‘template’ of government-
driven strategies, as well as the lack of knowledge of alternative firm-
level methods, reduces executives’ capacity to act. As shown above some 
corporate leaders consider corruption as a way to develop their business 
(the exploitation disposition). Corporations tend to blame corruption in 
the public sector and hide internal corruption from the public, while the 
most important aspect of corruption — the interaction between the state 
and the firm — remains unscrutinized. 
 Only a few corporate executives demonstrated what we call ‘reflective 
leadership’. Reflective leaders confront external corruption proactively 
and deploy anti-corruption instruments to deal with the firm’s internal 
corruption. This is a particularly daunting task in systemically corrupt 
environments. It boils down to tackling specific corruption risks associated 
with non-compliant practices where these are widespread in the company, 
i.e. with a concrete set of objectives in mind. One of the interviewed CEOs 
framed it as follows: 
We spend hundreds of millions on IT and I knew that we suffered from 
kickbacks received by our purchasing managers from vendors. I wanted to 
fight this so I have set three goals: reduction of our IT-related costs by 10 
per cent next year; a review of the list of our IT vendors in order to get rid 
of companies affiliated with our managers in some way, and uncovering a 
few cases of kickbacks and making them public.
29  V. Anand, B. E. Ashforth and M. Joshi, ‘Business as Usual: The Acceptance and 
Perpetuation of Corruption in Organizations’, Academy of Management Executive, 19, 
2005, 4, pp. 9-23; P. Fleming and S. C. Zyglidopoulos, Charting Corporate Corruption: 
Agency, Structure and Escalation, Cheltenham and Northampton, MA, 2009.
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A combination of both top-down and bottom-up approaches could make a 
difference at the firm level. However, we found that in the majority of cases 
executives either do not try or struggle to identify the shortlist of most 
damaging practices. We propose a simple yet comprehensive four-step 
approach to identify targets of anticorruption strategies at the firm level. 
 First, we develop a custom-made list of practices using in-depth 
interviews with executives and the content analysis of business publications 
in the national and regional media. It is essential to keep the original 
formulation of practices — sample of the formulations can be found in 
Table 1 — while verifying the list against existing classifications.30 
 Second, experts with deep company knowledge (senior executives and 
business unit managers) are invited to add to the list of practices, especially 
where these are specific for their own company. It is practical to keep 
the list manageable so that it can be converted into a simple-to-answer 
questionnaire. Any omission may lead to failure to identify some of the 
most widespread practices and those that are taken for granted. 
 Third, once the final list is determined, company employees are asked 
to assess whether, in their experience, these practices occur ‘systematically’, 
‘occasionally’ or ‘never’. Since the study takes place in systemically corrupt 
environments, where informal networks and cultural traditions penetrate 
corporate organizations, people who know about the practice may be 
constrained from reporting it, even if they do not directly participate in 
it. To overcome this limitation, we recommend: a large random sample of 
firms’ employees at all levels, on-line survey, anonymity of respondents 
and a survey administrator independent of the management. The survey 
produces a list of the informal practices most frequently recognized 
and acknowledged by company employees. It will form a foundation for 
prioritising targets and developing specific anti-corruption measures. 
 Fourth, the CEO and senior corporate leaders select a limited number 
of specific practices they want to target, identify concrete goals they aim 
to achieve with regard to each of them and select monitoring instruments. 
The proposed instrument allows executives to identify specific corruption 
risks rather than ‘corruption in general’, to direct limited resources to most 
relevant targets, to communicate the anti-corruption strategy effectively 
and to monitor the change. 
30  See Tanzi, Corruption Around the World; Karklins, The System Made Me Do It; 
Transparency International typology of corruption in TI 2012 <http://www.transparency.
org/cpi2012/results>.
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 We came across three companies that have successfully implemented 
a similar approach. The choice of appropriate execution strategies is 
discussed in the next section.  
3. Firm-level strategies 
Our research into corruption mitigation strategies adopted by companies 
operating in Russia has tested Lange’s model of organizational controls. In 
his theoretical attempt to organize existing internal corruption mitigation 
mechanisms Lange identifies four types (functions) of corruption controls 
by organizations: 1) autonomy reduction (AR); 2) consequence systems 
(CS); ensuring reward and punishment; 3) environmental sanctioning, 
‘in which an organization interprets and transmits external pressures to 
the member for legal/regulatory compliance and social conformity’ (ES); 
4) ‘intrinsically oriented controls, in which an organization fosters and 
facilitates the member’s own inclination to reject corruption behavior’ 
(IC).31 In other words, the executives who subscribe to the management of 
corruption adopt two distinct types of strategies when dealing with it — 
control and prevention — and use two distinct transmitting channels for 
their actions — organizational hierarchies and personal networks. 
 In the control mode, managers deal with non-compliant practices 
reactively after these practices have already taken place and damaged the 
business. For example, the CEO of an oil company publicly fired a successful 
regional manager for selling gasoline at a lower price to a company affiliated 
with him. In the prevention mode, executives deal with risks which might 
hurt the business if they occur in the future and proactively look out for 
practices that may be indicative of those risks. For example, the CEO of a 
mining company issued an executive order prohibiting sales managers from 
sponsoring foreign trips for government officials. 
 Hierarchical strategies imply the use of such institutional instruments 
as executive orders and procedures, codes of conducts, incentive-based 
systems (punitive or rewarding), formal agendas, direct campaigns. 
Network-based channels are used for communicating informal signals, 
hidden agendas, personalized incentives and other methods of informal 
governance.32
 Our interviewees point out that in addition to formal policies, it is crucial 
to communicate the degree of commitment of the leadership informally. 
Informal incentives and signals can be more effective in mitigating 
31  D. Lange, ‘A Multidimensional Conceptualization of Organizational Corruption 
Control’, Academy of Management Review, 33, 2008, 3, pp. 710-29.
32  Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?, pp. 211-43.
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corruption risks and preventing specific informal practices by personal 
example. One CEO set an example for his regional directors and declared 
a personal commitment to fight conflicts of interest among managers 
working with informally affiliated vendors and suppliers. He sent a strong 
signal about the forthcoming change through his company-wide informal 
network: he would no longer tolerate any divergence from the new strategy, 
no matter how close his relationships with a particular manager had been 
in the past. According to him, that informal warning had a stronger impact 
than all formal policies and procedures developed to tackle the issue. 
 The combination of two modes and two types of transmitting channels 
discussed above creates four ideal types of corruption management at the 
firm level, as presented in Table 4.
Table 4. Types of corruption management at the firm level
Types of Corruption Management Control Prevention
Formal channels (heirarchical, official, 
written, codified)
Reactive 
management 
through formal 
channels (1)
Proactive 
management 
through formal 
channels (3)
Informal channels (network-based, 
unofficial, unwritten, non-codified)
Reactive 
management 
through informal 
channels (2)
Proactive 
management 
through informal 
channels (4)
 The four types are ideal types. Thus, in the example above, the CEO 
has applied proactive management through informal channels, yet he has 
also targeted widespread practices of conflict of interest indicating that his 
actions may have been reactive. Below, we illustrate the ideal types with 
examples that featured in our qualitative database: 
1.  Reactive-formal. An internal audit investigation of acquisition of assets 
in a new region results in identifying a conflict of interest on the part 
of the responsible manager. The CEO fires the manager for abuse of 
corporate office.
2.  Reactive-informal. With the help of the founder-CEO’s network, a 
bank employee caught stealing $200,000 from a bank client is not 
only sacked, but a criminal case against him is opened and a five-year 
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sentence handed down. Reactive in one case, the sentence is a powerful 
deterrent for other employees.
3.  Proactive-formal. Rotating membership in a tender committee every 
two years as a matter of policy prevents long-term informal affiliations 
of its members, bias in decisions and inflated contracts for affiliated 
vendor and suppliers of large oil and gas companies.
4.  Proactive-informal. Before introducing a new policy with regard to 
purchasing managers’ expenses, a Russian energy company CEO 
attends a number of meetings with them and discusses the proposed 
policy off the record. These meetings allow the managers to share 
concerns, raise important questions and create awareness, thus giving 
them a chance to adjust their routines in advance of publication of the 
formal policy. 
 None of the described types of strategies is superior in delivering effective 
management of corruption. The choice depends on such contingencies as 
the nature and prioritization of specific corruption risks, the initiators, 
beneficiaries and cost bearers of the specific non-compliant practice, the 
resources available to the CEO, and the corporate culture of the firm. 
CEOs of companies operating in a systemically corrupt environment need 
to master all four types and to develop the largest possible arsenal of anti-
corruption strategies.33
 The example of one leading Russian energy company demonstrates 
how it can be done. In 2010, the CEO’s team initiated a thorough 
investigation of corruption risks in the company and identified two 
targets: vendors’ kickbacks and managers’ conflicts of interest. With an 
aim to fully eradicate cases of undeclared and unauthorized conflict of 
interest in relation to vendors’ contracts in excess of US $20 million and 
to reduce total corporate purchasing costs by 15 per cent in three years. 
They identified the initiators (owners and managers of suppliers related to 
corporate executives and corporate executives), the beneficiaries (corporate 
executives and related parties, owners of vendor companies) and the cost 
bearers (five individuals, including the CEO, who owned the company). 
After that the CEO and his team outlined a set of specific strategies with 
regard to each identified stakeholder group, as presented below in Table 5. 
33  A simulation game was developed by Stanislav Shekshnia and Alena Ledeneva as an 
INSEAD tool of training leaders for handling high-risk environment and uncertainty.
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Table 5. Corruption mitigation strategies
Stakeholders
Owners and CEOs of vendors Corporate executives with 
conflict of interest
Control/Informal Collecting rumours about 
vendors/executives’ relations 
through  informal networks.
Sending informal signals 
to specific executives to fix 
their conflict of interest or 
to be publicly ostracized.
Control/Formal Breaking contracts with 
vendors suspected to be in 
affiliation with corporate 
executives.
Instructing internal audit and 
internal security to conduct 
investigations of potential 
cases of conflict of interest.
Amnesty (3 months) for all 
reported cases of conflict 
of interest.
Firing people with conflict 
of interest after 3 months.
Opening criminal cases 
against some executives.
Prevention/
Informal
Informal CEO meetings 
with key suppliers to 
communicate the new policy 
and advise on disengaging 
corporate executives and their 
relatives from shareholders/
beneficiaries of their 
businesses.
Sending a strong signal 
through the company 
grapevine about the 
seriousness of the new 
strategy.
Prevention/Formal Updating vendors’ 
management rules.
Communicating new 
procedures of vendors’ 
management at vendors’ 
conference.
Establishing conflict 
commissions for vendors’ 
complaints.
Replacing committee 
principle with individual 
general manager’s 
responsibility in 
purchasing management.
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 After three years these anti-corruption initiatives have achieved some 
tangible results: the cost of purchasing decreased by 15 per cent, more than 
twenty companies were excluded from the suppliers’ list, twenty-seven 
corrupt managers lost their jobs, and five received jail terms. 
Conclusion
We would like to conclude by summarizing key action points for senior 
business leaders to effectively manage corruption in systemically corrupt 
environments such as Russia:
1. Make corruption management one of the CEO’s top priorities. Start 
by recognizing corruption as a major risk for the company and its 
stakeholders, overcome blind spots and lack of recognition with regard 
to corruption risks. 
2. Channel the priority status of the anti-corruption management through 
both the organizational hierarchy and informal networks.
3. Use a bottom-up, ethnographic approach to identify specific practices 
that are particularly problematic. Spend time and resources investigating 
which specific informal practices inflict most systematic damage on 
the corporation. ‘Slice’ the corruption ‘elephant’ into smaller pieces that 
can be more easily tackled in endemically corrupt environments.
4. Target specific non-compliant practices, not corruption in general. 
5. Combine formal tools and informal influence. Effective anti-corruption 
strategies are based both on formal tools (such as hotlines, codes 
of conduct, open tender competition and standard policies and 
procedures) and informal influence (role modelling, peer pressure and 
other instruments of informal governance). 
6. Provide training to employees to develop skills to identify, articulate, 
measure and mitigate non-compliant practices. Most CEOs seeking to 
mitigate the risks of business corruption in Russian companies agree 
that making key employees at every level of the organization active 
participants in the anti-corruption strategy is critical for its success. 
Conducting detailed surveys on informal practices and providing a 
platform for discussion of the elephant-in-the-room in systemically 
corrupt environments is an important addition to anti-corruption 
legal training and integrity education. A leader’s will to control the 
risks associated with corruption, to go beyond general programmes 
of anti-corruption compliance and to offer specific skills to identify, 
articulate, measure and manage corrupt practices can and does work 
in endemically corrupt environments.  
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Appendix 1 — Descriptive Statistics 
Frequency Per cent Cumulative 
per cent
Firm size: number of employees
no response 8 7.27 7.27
> 50,000 4 3.64 10.91
10,000 – 49,999 10 9.09 20.00
1,0000 – 9,999 21 19.09 39.09
100 – 999 33 30.00 69.09
50 – 99 14 12.73 81.82
> 50 20 18.18 100.00
Industry
no response 5 4.55 4.55
extractive industry 3 2.73 7.27
energy, oil & gas 7 6.36 13.64
manufacturing 13 11.82 25.45
telecommunications & IT 16 14.55 40.00
financial services 12 10.91 50.91
retail 5 4.55 55.45
services 25 22.73 78.18
other 24 21.82 100.00
Firm ownership
no response 5 4.55 4.55
foreign company 13 11.82 16.36
joint venture 9 8.18 24.55
public company 5 4.55 29.09
government-controlled public company 2 1.82 30.91
state-owned company 6 5.45 36.36
private company 70 63.64 100.00
Firm: present in number of regions
no response 5 4.55 4.55
> 10 28 25.45 30.00
5 – 9 17 15.45 45.45
2 – 4 41 37.27 82.73
1 19 17.27 100.00
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Frequency Per cent Cumulative 
per cent
Firm: age
no response 6 5.45 5.45
> 20 16 14.55 20.00
11 – 20 46 41.82 61.82
6 – 10 25 22.73 84.55
2 – 5 12 10.91 95.45
< 5 5 4.55 100.00
Respondent: position in firm
no response 5 4.55 4.55
supervisory board 12 10.91 15.45
vice-president 6 5.45 20.91
CEO 40 36.36 57.27
board of directors 13 11.82 69.09
shareholder 10 9.09 78.18
other 24 21.82 100.00
Respondent: years within firm
no response 5 4.55 4.55
11 – 20 25 22.73 27.27
6 – 10 31 28.18 55.45
2 – 5 36 32.73 88.18
< 5 13 11.82 100.00
TOTAL 110 100.00
